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Report on the State 
of the Legal Market2013
The Center for the Study of the Legal Profession at the Georgetown 
University Law Center and Thomson Reuters Peer Monitor are pleased 
to present this 2013 Report highlighting the trends that we perceived in
the legal market in 2012, as well as the factors that we believe will impact
the market in 2013 and beyond. 1
Introduction – Time to Burn the Ships?
Asweenter2013,thelegalmarketcontinuesinthefifthyearofanun-
precedentedeconomicdownturnthatbeganinthethirdquarterof2008.
Atthispoint,itisbecomingincreasinglyapparentthatthemarketforlegal
servicesintheUnitedStatesandthroughouttheworldhaschangedin
fundamentalwaysandthat,evenasweworkourwayoutoftheeconomic
doldrums,thepracticeoflawgoingforwardislikelytobestarklydifferent
thaninthepre-2008period.Thechallengeforlawyersandlawfirmsisto
understandthewaysinwhichthelegalmarkethasshiftedandtoadjust
theirownstrategies,expectations,andwaysofworkingtoconformtothe
newmarketrealities.Whilethereiscertainlyevidencethatsomefirms
andlawyershavebeguntomaketheseadjustments,manyothersseem
tobeindenial,believing(orperhapshoping)thattheworldwillgo"back
tonormal"assoonasdemandforlegalservicesbeginstogrowagain.
Legendhasitthatin1519,whenheandhiscohortofsome500soldiers
and100sailorslandedontheshoresoftheYucatanintentonconquering
thelargeandpowerfulAztecempire,SpanishconquistadorHernando
Cortezpromptlyorderedhismento"burntheships."Cortezknewthat,
unlessmoretemptingalternativeswereremoved,itwouldbedifficultto
motivatehismentotakeonanempirewithalargearmythathadbeenin
powerformorethansixcenturies.Hence,hisboldanddecisiveorder.
Thelegalmarkettodayisanincreasinglydifficultandchallengingenvi-
ronment,onethatcallsforclearthinking,strategicfocus,andflexibilityin
addressingrapidlychangingrealities.Toanunfortunateextent,however,
manylawyersandlawfirmsseemstuckinoldmodels–traditionalways
ofthinkingaboutlawfirmeconomicsandstructure,legalworkprocesses,
talentmanagement,andclientrelationships–thatarenolongerwell
suitedtothemarketenvironmentinwhichtheycompete.Perhapsit's
timeforus,likeCortez,toburntheships–toforceourselvestothink
outsideourtraditionalmodelsand,howeveruncomfortableitmightbe,to
imaginenewandcreativewaystodeliverlegalservicesmoreefficiently
andbuildmoresustainablemodelsoflawfirmpractice.
1TheCenterfortheStudyoftheLegalProfessionandThomsonReutersPeerMonitorgratefullyacknowledgetheparticipation
ofthefollowingpersonsinthepreparationofthisReport:fromtheCenterfortheStudyoftheLegalProfession–JamesW.
Jones,SeniorFellow(leadauthor);MiltonC.Regan,Jr.,ProfessorofLawandCo-Director;andLisaH.Rohrer,Research
Fellow;andfromThomsonReutersPeerMonitor–MarkMedice,SeniorDirector.
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Inthesectionsthatfollow,wedescribethetrendsthatwehaveobservedinthelegal
marketin2012,explorethelongertermimplicationsofthosetrendsforthefuture,
andsuggestsomewaysinwhichlawyersandlawfirmscanbetterpositionthem-
selvestodealwithnewemergingmarketrealities.
Financial Results in 2012
Fromafinancialpointofview,2012wasanotheryearofonlymodestgrowthaslaw
firmscontinuedtostrugglewiththecombinedimpactsofsluggishdemand,declining
productivity,fallingrealizationrates,andtheneedforfurtherexpensereductions.While
thereweresomebrightspots,onthewholethelegalmarketcontinuedinthefinancial
doldrums.
Demand
Followingeightstraightquartersofnegativedemandgrowthasreflectedindeclining
billablehours,theU.S.legalmarketturnedbackintopositiveterritoryinQ42010but
hasbeenunabletosustainsteadyandpositivegrowthindemandforlegalservices.2
AstrackedintheThomsonReutersPeerMonitordatabase,3 thatpatterncontinued
in2012withagrowthrateof0.5percent.AsshowninChart1below,however,the
presentrateremainswellbelowthatinthepre-2008period,whenannualdemand
growthaveraged3.9percent.
Chart 1 - Growth in Demand for Legal Services
2Source:ThomsonReutersPeerMonitor.Forpresentpurposes,"demandforlegalservices"isviewedasequivalentto
totalbillablehoursrecordedbyfirmsincludedinaparticulardatabase.Q1demandwas1.5percent,whileQ2was-0.2
percent,Q3was-0.8percent,andQ4was1.5,forafullyearresultof0.5percent.
3ThomsonReutersPeerMonitordata("PeerMonitordata")arebasedonreportedresultsfrom130lawfirms,including50
AmLaw100firms,45AmLaw2nd100firms,and35additionalfirms.
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AsshowninChart2below,amongvariousspecialtyareas,whenmeasuredonafull-
yearbasis,laborandemploymentpracticesshowedthehighestdemandgrowthin
2012(at4.1percent),whilecorporatepracticesexperiencedmodestgrowth(at1.2
percent)andotherpracticessawdeclines.
Chart 2 - 2012 Demand Growth by Practice
ThemodestdemandgrowthintheUnitedStatesreflectedasimilarpatterninthe
legalmarketsoftheUnitedKingdomandmainlandEurope.InSeptember,Legal
Business 100 reportedthat,drivenbycontinuedsluggishmarketdemand,revenues
ofU.K.firmsin2012grewbyabout6percentover2011levels4 (accountingonlyfor
theeffectsoforganicgrowthasopposedtogrowththroughcombinationswithother
firms).5 While2012dataforContinentalEuropeisnotyetavailable,The Lawyer's
2011surveyofthe100largestindependentfirmsinEuropefoundthatalmosthalf
hadachievedlessthan5percentgrowthinrevenuesduringtheprecedingyear.
TheseorganicgrowthratesaresimilartothoseexperiencedbyU.S.firmsandwell
belowtheneardoubledigitratesenjoyedbymostfirmsinthepre-2008period.
ThedemandpicturewasdifferentinAsiaandLatinAmerica,wherehighgrowth
nationalandregionaleconomiescontinuedtodrivedemandforlegalservices.As
describedbelowthisresultedinasignificantincreaseinglobalmergeractivityand
intheopeningofAsianandLatinAmericanofficesbyU.S.,U.K.,andEuropean
firms.As2012drewtoaclose,however,eventhepowerfuleconomicenginesof
ChinaandBrazilhadbeguntoslowsomewhat,introducingadditionaluncertainty
intotheabilityoftheemergingeconomiestodrivetheglobaldemandgrowthfor
legalservicestothesameextentasinthepast.
4MostU.K.firmsendtheirfiscalyearsinApril.Hencethecomparisonof2012to2011referstofiscalratherthan
calendaryears.
5TheLegal Business 100 surveyindicatedthattheoverallrevenuesofU.K.firmsincreasedby14percent.Much
ofthisgrowth,however,resultedfrommergeractivityasopposedtoorganicgrowth.Ifthecontributionofmerger
relatedrevenuegrowthisremoved,theresulting"organicgrowth"figureis6percent.
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Productivity
During2012,thenumberoflawyersinU.S.firmsgrewby2percent,atthesametime
that(asnotedpreviously)demandgrewbyonly0.5percent.Asaresult,growthin
productivity–definedasthetotalnumberofbillablehoursrecordedbyafirmdivided
bythetotalnumberoflawyersinthefirm–remainednegativeat-1.5percentforfirms
inthePeerMonitordatabase.Thislacklusterperformanceintermsofproductivityis
notnew.AscanbeseeninChart3below,whenmeasuredintermsofbillablehours
permonthperlawyer,productivityhasbeenessentiallyflatforthepastthreeyears.
Chart 3 - Hours per Lawyer
Thisconstrainedgrowthinproductivityisparticularlysignificantifweremember
thatU.S.lawfirmsimposedsubstantialstaffingcutsin2009and2010.Indeed,
firmscoveredbytheNLJ250surveyreportedlayingoff5,259lawyersin2009
alone–adeclineof4percentinthetotallawyerpopulationandareductionof8.7
percentinthetotalnumberofassociates.6 Moreover,eveninthethree-yearperiod
priortotheeconomicdownturnin2008,productivitygrowthwasessentiallyflatin
alllawyercategories–equitypartners,incomepartners,andassociates.7
Itisalsoinstructivetocomparethebillablehoursperlawyeroverthelastthreeyears
withthecomparablefiguresforthepre-2008period.AsindicatedinChart3above,
during2006and2007,billablehoursforbothequitypartnersandassociateswere
runningabout10hourspermonthabovetheaveragesinthepost-2008period.That
ofcoursetranslatestoadifferenceofmorethan100billablehoursperyearinboth
categoriesandstronglysuggestsacontinuingproblemofovercapacityinthemarket.
6LisaJones,SoLong,Farewell,Nat'lL.J.,Nov.9,2009.
7Source:ThomsonReutersPeerMonitor.
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SimilarovercapacityproblemshavealsobeenevidentintheU.K.market.According
totheLegal Business 100 survey,thenumberoftotallawyersintheUK100firms
grewby9percentinfiscal2012,althoughsomeofthatgrowthcanbeattributedto
mergers.Nonetheless,manyU.K.firmsseemtohaveincreasedheadcountata
fasterpacethancouldbejustifiedbydemandgrowth,thusleadingsometoembrace
anotherroundoflawyerlayoffs.8
Rates and Realization
Firmscontinuedtoraiseratesduring2012although,asinthepastfouryears,clients
continuedtopushbackstrongly.Asaresult,realizationrates–i.e., thepercentages
ofworkperformedatafirm'sstandardratesthatareactuallybilledtoandcollected
fromclients–continuedtodecline,reachinghistoriclows.Thefirmscoveredinthe
PeerMonitordatabaseraisedtheirratesonaverage3.4percentduring2012.While
thisincreasewaswellbelowthe6-8percentrangeseenannuallyduringthepre-
recessionperiod,itwasconsistentwithratetrendsoverthepastthreeorfouryears.
AscanbeseeninChart4below,duringthepastthreeyears,firmsincreasedtheir
averagestandardratefrom$464to$507perhour,anincreaseof9.3percent.Atthe
sametime,however,theiraveragecollectedraterosefrom$397to$421perhour,an
increaseofonly6percent.
Chart 4 - Rate Progression
Whatthisgapbetweenstandardandcollectedratesindicatesisthatfirmrealization
ratescontinuedtodeclinein2012.AsshowninChart5onthenextpage,thecol-
lectedrealizationrateagainststandardforallfirmsinthePeerMonitordatabasenow
averages83.6percent,afigurethatisanhistoriclowandsome8percentlowerthan
the92percentlevelattheendof2007.Actually,forAmLaw100firms,therealization
rateisevenlower,at82.8percent.9
8JamesSwift, Focus on Slimmer, Fitter Firms,TheLawyer,Aug.6,2012,http://www.thelawyer.com/focus-on-slimmer-fitter-
firms/1013722.article.
9 TherealizationrateforAmLaw200firmsis85percentandforothermidsizedfirmscoveredinthePeerMonitordatabase
84.3percent.
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Chart 5 - Billed and Collected Rates
against Standard
Expenses
Shortlyaftertheeconomicdownturnbeganinthethirdquarterof2008,mostfirmstook
stepstopreservetheirprofitabilitybysharplycuttingexpenses,primarilythroughlegal
andnon-legalstafflayoffs.Theseausteritymeasuresdramaticallyreducedbothdirect
andindirectexpenses10untilmid-year2010when,asshowninChart6onthenext
page,suchexpensesbegantogrowagain.Thisrenewedgrowthwasnotparticularly
surprisingsincemanyoftheexpense"cuts"werereallyonlydeferralsofexpenditures
thathadtobemadesoonerorlaterratherthaneliminationsofparticularprogramsor
activities.AsindicatedinChart6,theexpenseincreasesappearedtoleveloutin2012,
perhapssuggestingthatmanyfirmsimposedadditionalcostcontrolsinaneffortto
bolsteroverallprofitability.
10Directexpensesrefertothoseexpensesrelatedtofeeearners(primarilythecompensationandbenefitscostsoflawyers
andothertimekeepers).Indirectexpensesrefertoallotherexpensesofthefirm(includingoccupancycosts,technology,
administrativestaff,etc.).
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Chart 6 - Expense Growth
SimilarexpensepressureswereexperiencedbyU.K.firms.AccordingtotheLegal
Business 100 survey,duringfiscal2012,averagecostsperlawyerinUK100firmsrose
4percentcomparedwiththepreviousyear.
Profits per Partner
Asaresultofthecombinationofcontinuedsluggishdemandgrowth,persistentover-
capacitythatdampenedproductivity,clientresistancetofeeincreases,anddeclining
realizationrates,profitsperpartnerofU.S.firmsin2012grewmodestlybyanaver-
ageof3.58percent.Growthdifferedbysegment,however,withAmLaw100firms
growingonaverageby2.45percent,whereasotherfirmsgrewprofitsbyanaverage
of4percent.11 ThisisconsistentwithexperienceintheU.K.,wherethe Legal Busi-
ness 100 surveyreportedprofitgrowthforfiscal2012atamodestlevelof2percent
overtheprioryear.
Ofcourse,theseresultswerenottrueofallfirms,andsomefirmshadverysuccessful
yearsdespitethelacklusterperformanceofthemarketasawhole.Nonetheless,from
afinancialstandpoint,thelegalmarketsawonlymodestgainsduring2012.
11 Source:ThomsonReutersPeerMonitor.Thisresultisconsistentwiththepredictionsoflawfirmmanagingpartnersand
chairsearlierintheyear.InApril2012,inasurveyofleadersof52oftheworld'slargestlawfirmsconductedbyThomson
Reuters,64percentofrespondentspredictedthattheirfirms'profitperequitypartnergrowthin2012wouldbeinthe1to5
percentrange.ThomsonReuters2012LEBPreSurvey,April2012.Theresultisalsoconsistentwithmarketperform-
ancein2011.AccordingtotheAltmanWeil2012LawFirmsinTransitionSurveyofthemanagingpartnersandchairsof
238U.S.lawfirms(including40percentofthelargest250firms)(the"AltmanWeil2012Survey"),48percentofrespon-
dentsreportedtheirfirms'profitsperequitypartnerincreasingby4percentormoreduring2011,23percentreportedan
increaseof1to4percent,and29percentreportedprofitsaseitherunchangedordeclining.AltmanWeil2012Survey,at
11.Interestingly,almost48percentofrespondentsalsoindicatedthattheybelievedthataslowdowninthegrowthofprof-
itsperpartnerwillbeapermanenttrendinthelegalmarketgoingforward.Id. at13.
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8Other Highlights of 2012
Apart from the financial performance of law firms, there were other developments in
2012 that are worth noting because of their potential to alter the shape of the legal
market in the future.  These included the rapid continuing pace of globalization, the
shifting economic and demographic realities resulting from persistent overcapacity, 
and the growing pressures on the traditional partnership model of law practice.
Growing Pace of Globalization 
Despite (or perhaps partly because of) the challenging economics of the current legal
market, 2012 was a banner year for global expansion of U.S. and international law firms.
There were 96 cross-border mergers announced during the year, substantially more than
in any prior year.  Some of the mergers either announced or becoming effective in 2012
were very substantial, including the combinations of:
• U.K.-based Ashurst with Australia's Blake Dawson;
• Australia's Mallesons Stephen Jacques with China's King & Wood;
• SNR Denton with Canada-based Fraser Milner Casgrain and 
Paris-based Salans;
• Norton Rose with Calgary-based MacLeod Dixon;
• Norton Rose with Fulbright & Jaworski (effective June 1, 2013);
• London's Herbert Smith with Australia's Freehills;
• K&L Gates with Australian-based Middletons; and
• Canada-based Fasken Martineau with Johannesburg-based Bell Dewar.
In addition, U.S. law firms in 2012 continued a very aggressive global expansion through
the opening of new offices around the world (some, particularly in Singapore and South
Korea, designed to take advantage of recently relaxed practice restrictions by local bars).
There were 56 such foreign offices opened by U.S. firms during 2012, with 28 in Asia (pri-
marily in South Korea and China), 15 in Europe (principally in Germany and Russia/CIS),12
6 in the Middle East and Africa, and 7 in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
This aggressive global expansion obviously reflects strategic judgments on the part of
many firms that a more credible and comprehensive global footprint is needed to serve
the needs of their international clients.  It may also reflect a decision to focus more as-
sets in regions such as Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, where economic con-
ditions appear more conducive to growth at least in the near-term than in North
America or Europe.
Problem of Overcapacity
The continuing effort of law firms to address declines in demand and productivity through
the "downsizing" of their legal staffs was starkly evident in 2012.  In July, the National As-
sociation for Law Placement released the results of its annual survey,13 showing that just
12  Much of the activity in Europe occurred in the wake of the demise of Dewey & LeBoeuf, as various U.S. firms picked up
former Dewey offices in that region.
13  NALP's Employment Report and Salary Survey for the Class of 2011, as reported in the NALP press release Median Pri-
vate Practice Starting Salaries for the Class of 2011 Plunge as Private Practice Jobs Continue to Erode, July 12, 2012.
949.5 percent of law school graduates in 2011 had obtained jobs in law firms – a figure
that compared with 50.9 percent for the class of 2010 and 55.9 percent for the class
of 2009.  Moreover, of those graduates who did find jobs in law firms, nearly 60 per-
cent were in smaller firms of 50 or fewer lawyers.  That compared to 53 percent for
the class of 2010 and 46 percent for the class of 2009.  The proportion of new jobs in
firms of more than 250 lawyers decreased from 33 percent to slightly over 21 percent
in just two years.14
The overall employment rate for the class of 2011 graduates was 85.6 percent (as of
June 2012), a figure that was 6.3 percentage points below the recent historic high of
91.9 percent for the class of 2007.  For those who were employed, however, only 65.4
percent obtained jobs for which bar admission was required – a figure that drops to 
56.7 percent if part-time jobs and jobs lasting less than a year are excluded.  Overall, 
almost 12 percent of reported jobs were part-time.  And the number of graduates 
working for "legal temp agencies" rose dramatically to about 2 percent, the highest 
level since NALP began tracking that category in 2006.15
Principally because of hiring cutbacks by larger law firms, the increase in the number of
non-partner track positions in large firms, and (in some cases) salary reductions, the
median starting salary for 2011 law school graduates fell 5 percent from the 2010 level.
That represents a 17 percent decline in median starting salary since 2009.16 The me-
dian starting salary for graduates entering private practice fell over 18 percent from
2010, and an astonishing 35 percent since 2009.17
Moreover, law firm downsizing has not been limited to reductions in the associate ranks
alone.  Many firms have continued to raise their expectations for economic performance
by their partners and to weed out those who don't meet the new standards.  As recently
reported in the Wall Street Journal, some 15 percent of the roughly 120 firms surveyed
by Wells Fargo Private Bank's Legal Specialty Group say they intend to cut partners in
the first quarter of 2013, continuing a three-year trend.  Also, 55 percent of the 113 man-
aging partners and firm chairs responding to a recent American Lawyer survey said
they planned to ask one to five partners to leave the firm in the coming year, and 5 per-
cent reported that they planned to cut between 11 and 20 partners in 2013.18
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. The mean salary for 2011 graduates fell 6.5 percent compared with 2010.  Since 2009, the mean salary level has de-
clined almost 16 percent.
17 Id.  On a brighter note, the median salary for government jobs has remained unchanged since 2009, at $52,000.  For ju-
dicial clerkships, the median salary of $52,000 was also unchanged from 2010 but up $2,000 from 2009.  And for public
interest organizations (including legal service providers and public defenders), the median salary rose from $43,000 to
$45,000.
18 Jennifer Smith, Law-Firm Partners Face Layoffs, in Wall Street Journal Online, Jan. 6, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB10001424127887323689604578. 
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Pressures on Traditional Partnership Model
Certainly one of the most dramatic events in the legal market in 2012 was the well pub-
licized collapse of New York's Dewey & LeBoeuf, a firm that dissolved after a 100-year
history.  While the story of that collapse is in itself an interesting cautionary tale, it may
also be symptomatic of a deeper and more serious problem – the growing pressures
that have been building for some time around the traditional partnership model used in
most law firms.  
During the past four years of the economic downturn, it has become increasingly ob-
vious that many law firm partnerships have experienced mounting stress relating to
compensation, the reductions in the ranks of equity partners, the treatment of lateral
partners, and the management of partner expectations.  And the combination of all of
these factors – coupled with a growing sense of disenfranchisement – has resulted in
partner morale problems in many firms.
As firms have struggled with sluggish demand growth and low productivity, they have
increasingly raised the bar for admission to their equity partnerships and (in many
cases)  increased the number of lawyers in non-equity partnership positions, some-
times through so-called "de-equitizations."  Among AmLaw 200 firms, 169 reported
having two-tiered partnerships 19 in 2011, an increase over the 166 reported in 2005
and the 146 reported in 2000.  Similarly, the percentage of AmLaw 200 lawyers who
are equity partners dropped to 25 percent in 2011, down from 34 percent in 2005 and
36 percent in 2000. 20 Further, an analysis of the AmLaw 200 survey data from 2006
through 2012 shows a compound annual growth rate ("CAGR") of 1.2 percent for 
equity partners and 7 percent for non-equity partners.  Increasingly, a lawyer's ability
to generate significant business (often called client originations) has emerged as the
critical dividing line between equity and non-equity partners.21
Not surprisingly, as a result of these changes, the compensation gap between equity
and non-equity partners is growing rapidly.  According to the MLA Partner Compensation
Survey, equity partners now average about 2.5 times the total compensation of
their non-equity colleagues.  During the past year, the compensation of equity part-
ners jumped some 11 percent, while the compensation of non-equity partners was
essentially flat.22
At the same time, there is anecdotal evidence that spreads in compensation between
the highest and lowest paid partners (even within equity partner ranks) have widened in
recent years.  Traditionally, such spreads were typically in the 4:1 or 5:1 range, but they
have now increased to 6:1 or 7:1 and in some firms have gone much higher still.23
19 A "two-tiered partnership" is one that includes both equity and non-equity partners.
20 Source: AmLaw 200 surveys, as reported by Fairfax Associates in September 2012.
21 In the 2012 Partner Compensation Survey conducted by Major Lindsey & Africa among partners in AmLaw 200, NLJ
250, and Global 100 firms in the U.S. (the "MLA Partner Compensation Survey"), 74 percent of respondents noted that
originations were a "very important" factor in determining compensation in their firms; 65 percent perceived it to be the
"most important" factor (working receipts being the next closest at 21 percent); and 55 percent of respondents said that
originations are becoming more important in the compensation process (up significantly from 24 percent in 2010).  MLA
Partner Compensation Survey at 7-8.
22 MLA Partner Compensation Survey at 8.
23 Based on information obtained from consultants by the Center for the Study of the Legal Profession.
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These increasing spreads reflect in part the perceived need by firms to keep major
"rainmakers" happy at a time when lateral movements of partners have become in-
creasingly routine.24
Such lateral movements themselves have been an additional source of friction in many
firms, as there is a perception that laterals are often paid disproportionately more than
"home grown" partners for similar "books of business."  In its latest Lateral Report in
February 2012, The American Lawyer indicated that, in the twelve months ending Sep-
tember 30, 2011, there had been 2,454 lateral movements of partners among AmLaw
200 firms, a 22 percent increase over the prior year.25 And there is some evidence that
lateral moves typically result in increased compensation.  In the MLA Partner Compen-
sation Survey for 2012, of 930 lateral partners who were queried, some 62 percent re-
ported that their compensation had increased as a result of their lateral moves, a figure
that compared to 57 percent in 2010.26
All of these factors have combined in the past few years to create growing morale
problems in many firms, particularly among "home grown" service partners who per-
ceive themselves as essential to the quality of legal services delivered by their firms
but who lack the origination credits to be regarded as significant rainmakers.  Such
partners often complain that they also feel increasingly disenfranchised as partners –
removed from the power centers of their firms and often treated more like corporate
employees than partial owners of their organizations.  While few firms experience
these morale issues to the same extent as Dewey & LeBoeuf, the feelings are in-
creasingly common across the market.
To some extent, declining morale reflects a failure of firm leadership to set and man-
age partner expectations.  This was, of course, stunningly obvious at Dewey, where
firm management failed to disclose a substantial number of partner compensation
guarantees to rank-and-file partners.  But unrealistic partner expectations – particu-
larly during a period of serious economic downturn – can impact almost all firms.  
To take but one example, the MLA Partner Compensation Survey reported average
compensation for all of its 2,228 respondents at $681,000 in 2012, up 6.4 percent from
2010.27 One could argue that this figure is fairly impressive, particularly four years into
the worst economic crisis the legal market has ever seen.  And yet, 58 percent of the
same respondents expressed dissatisfaction with their compensation levels, with 47
percent saying they should be earning 11 to 20 percent more and 27 percent saying
they should be earning 21 to 30 percent more.28 This at least suggests that there are
many partners with unrealistic economic expectations.
24 Interestingly, during the period of limited revenue growth since the onset of the current economic downturn in 2008, the
most highly compensated partners in firms have often suffered disproportionately from the constrained growth in their
firms' profits.  This is because more junior partners have continued to enjoy compensation increases simply by moving up
through the compensation ranks.  The partners at the top, however, often have nowhere to move and have thus seen their
compensation decline as a result of compression throughout the compensation system.  While such reductions might be
acceptable in the short term, when they begin to last four or five years, the partners at the top become more vocal in their
complaints, and their firms often respond by increasing the overall spreads in their compensation systems.  
25 The Lateral Report 2012, The American Lawyer, Feb. 1, 2012,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?id=1202477103222.
26 MLA Partner Compensation Survey at 12.
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id. at 28.
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Longer Term Implications
The economic performance of the legal market in 2012 and the other developments of
the past year as described previously are all part of an evolving pattern that signals 
significant long-term changes in the legal services market both in the U.S. and around
the world.  In the sections that follow, we have set out some of the implications of these
longer term changes for lawyers and law firms.  What they all have in common is the
necessity for rethinking old assumptions, for reconsidering previously accepted models
of the ways in which lawyers and their firms work, and for exploring new approaches to
meet changing market realities.  They all require us, in other words, to "burn the ships"
and to be open to new ways of thinking and operating.
A Changed Market Reality
It would be tempting to think that all of the dramatic changes in the legal market over
the past four years are attributable solely to the economic downturn that has shaken
the developed world since 2008 and that everything will go "back to normal" once
economic stability and growth return.  From this point of view, one would argue that
the crisis in the legal market has been driven entirely by a precipitous drop in the
overall demand for legal services and that we will be able to get back to business as
usual as soon as demand returns, as it surely must.  Unfortunately, however, this argu-
ment oversimplifies both the causes and the likely effects of the changes we are seeing.  
While it is clearly true that the economic downturn has been the proximate cause of
much of the disruption we have seen in the legal market, the recession alone does
not tell the whole story.  Even in the boom years of the decade preceding 2008, other
important market forces were at work gradually building toward an inflection point.
The financial crisis of 2008 may well have accelerated those forces – and perhaps
even exacerbated them – but these underlying market shifts would sooner or later have
resulted in fundamental changes in the legal industry even absent an economic crisis.
Among the underlying market forces that have been most important in driving change,
several deserve special mention.  These include:
• The growing availability of public information about law firms and their
capabilities, practices, clients, earnings, and profits that has driven an ever
more competitive and efficient market for legal services over the past three
decades; 29
• The inexorable drive toward the commoditization of legal services that has
impacted the work of lawyers at all levels; 30
29 The explosion of publicly available information about the business and practices of law firms around the world over the past
several years has been staggering.  It includes the proliferation of publications like The American Lawyer, Managing Partner
(in the U.K.), Lexpert (in Canada), Australasian Legal Business, and LatinLawyer (in Latin America); as well as the growing
number of third-party rating agencies like Chambers.
30 For a particularly informative description of the impact of commoditization on the evolution of legal service, see RICHARD
SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES ("Susskind"), at 27-36.
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• The growth of enabling technologies that has accelerated the drive toward
commoditization, tended to level the competitive playing field between large
firms and smaller ones, and changed legal staffing patterns by simplifying
tasks that were previously labor intensive; 31
• The emergence of non-traditional service providers that are creating new
forms of competition in the legal market; 32
• The changing roles of in-house general counsel and corporate law
departments that have increasingly displaced outside law firms as the
primary "trusted legal advisors" to corporate CEOs, often relegating outside
counsel to specialized advice only; 33
• The impact of globalization that has resulted in growing challenges for firms
seeking to serve the needs of their clients on a worldwide scale and, over
time, will result in a significant shift in global economic activity; 34 and
• The collapse of an unsustainable economic model that drove law firm growth
for a decade essentially on the ability of firms to raise their rates 6 to 8
percent a year with little regard for the economic impact of their decisions. 35
The combination of these factors with the effects of the economic downturn of the last
four years has resulted in at least two critical shifts in the market for legal services.  First,
there has been a shift from the seller's market that traditionally dominated the legal in-
dustry to a buyer's market that will likely remain the prevailing model for the foreseeable
future.  What this means is that all of the critical decisions related to the structure and
delivery of legal services – including judgments about scheduling, staffing, scope of
work, level of effort, pricing, etc. – are now being made primarily by clients and not by
their outside lawyers.  This represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between
lawyers and their clients.
Reflecting the increasing power of clients to define the terms of the attorney/client rela-
tionship, this shift has resulted in a new emphasis on efficiency and cost effectiveness in
the delivery of legal services.  Although obviously not true in all cases, clients increasingly
make decisions to hire outside lawyers on the basis of how efficiently, cost effectively, and
predictably they can deliver the services the client requires, with quality being taken as a
given.  As a result, to an extent barely imaginable only a few years ago, firms have found
themselves increasingly locked in procurement processes where clients are asking hard
questions about schedules, staffing, work process efficiencies, and cost. 
31  For a description of the growing impact of enabling technologies, see Susskind, at 59-145.
32  These include not only legal process outsourcers (like CPA Global and Pangea3) but also innovative new law firm models
(like Axiom and the VLP Law Group) and new service offerings from traditional law firms (like Morgan Lewis & Bockius' in-
novative eDiscovery Practice and Berwin Leighton Paisner's Lawyers on Demand).   
33  For a description of this changing role of the in-house lawyer by Ben Heineman, the former General Counsel of General
Electric, see Catherine Dunn, The In-House World According to Ben Heineman, Corporate Counsel, April 9, 2012.
34  The International Monetary Fund predicts that the composition of world GDP will shift dramatically over the next four
decades.  Specifically, the IMF forecasts that the percentage of world GDP attributable to North America will shift from 22
percent (in 2010) to 11 percent (in 2050), while Western Europe shifts from 19 percent to 7 percent, Developing Asia shifts
from 27 percent to 49 percent, and Africa shifts from 4 percent to 12 percent.  Source: IMF World Economic Outlook.
35  Careful analysis shows that, even in the boom years prior to the current economic downturn, the financial success of law
firms was driven primarily by annual rate increases that bore little relationship to what was going on in the broader econ-
omy.  Indeed, in the decade prior to 2008, such increases averaged 6 to 8 percent per year at a time when the national in-
flation rate never exceeded 4 percent.  The cumulative impact of these increases over time created a trajectory that was
simply unsustainable.
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The second critical shift in the legal market in the last four years has been the dramatic
increase in competition among firms.  In the pre-recession world, when the demand for
legal services was growing at a healthy clip of some 4 percent a year, most firms could
grow and prosper simply by capturing a reasonable share of the new business being
generated.  Since 2008, however, the reality has changed.  In a period of shrinking or
sluggish demand growth, the only way (short of a merger) for a firm to capture market
share is to take it from another firm, a circumstance that inevitably results in a ratchet-
ing up of competition in the market.  Given current economic trends, it appears likely
that the legal market will remain in this state of heightened competition for at least a few
more years.  Moreover, even as the demand for legal services begins to grow again, it
is likely (as noted below) to come back in significantly different ways – ways that may
not lessen overall competition among firms.
To adapt successfully to these new market realities, firms will need to be much more
strategically focused than in the past.  In a significantly more competitive environment,
it will be critical for firms to understand their unique strengths and to identify what differ-
entiates them from their competitors.  It will also be critical for law firm leaders to focus
on how their firms can respond effectively to client demands for more efficiency and
cost effectiveness in the delivery of legal services.  That will mean, among other things,
a willingness to abandon the traditional "one size fits all" mentality that has often domi-
nated legal management thinking and to adopt more flexible approaches that can tailor
staffing and leverage, technology support, work processes, and pricing models to meet
the needs of particular clients in particular situations.
Fortunately, there is evidence that many law firm leaders understand the realities of the
changed market and the imperative for their firms to act decisively to address them.
For example, more than 90 percent of the managing partners and chairs surveyed by
Altman Weil in its 2012 Law Firms in Transition Survey said that the recent recession
served as a "permanent accelerator of trends that already existed" or as a "game
changer" for the legal market.  And a substantial majority now sees trends like in-
creased pricing competition, more commoditization of legal work, more non-hourly
billing, fewer equity partners, more contract lawyers, reduced leverage, and smaller first
year classes as permanent trends going forward. 36 However, a substantial majority of
respondents also had much less confidence that their partners understand or appreci-
ate the challenges of the new legal market. 37 And some 60 percent indicated that, thus
far, law firms have shown only a low level of seriousness about changing their legal
service delivery model. 38 This latter view was also confirmed by an Altman Weil survey
of corporate chief legal officers in 2011, with the exception that the corporate CLOs
ranked law firm seriousness even lower. 39 Plainly there is more work to be done.
36  Altman Weil 2012 Survey, at i-ii, 1-2.
37  Id. at 6.
38  Id. at 8.
39  Id. at 10.  
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Growing Market Segmentation
As large markets become more efficient from a competitive standpoint, they tend to be-
come more segmented, with individual providers focusing on those parts of the market
that they can serve better than others.  In the past few years, we have begun to see the
emergence of such segmentation in the legal market in several different ways.
First, there has been a noticeable segmentation among law firms themselves, as some
firms have staked out market positions as providers of high end financial services or
general corporate services on a global basis, while others have opted for  specific in-
dustry concentrations (e.g., in the energy or technology or insurance sectors) or spe-
cific practice areas (e.g., as labor and employment or IP or litigation boutiques) or
specific service levels (e.g., as providers of low- to mid-value litigation or general repre-
sentation for major companies in particular geographic areas).  
This segmentation among firms has been bolstered by an increasing willingness on the
part of clients to "disaggregate" matters – both litigation and transactional – by parcel-
ing out different parts or phases of matters to different firms depending on expertise
and an ability to deliver cost effective services.40 It has also been driven by an increas-
ing willingness on the part of clients to entrust matters (or sometimes parts of matters)
to mid-sized or smaller firms that are more price competitive than their large firm coun-
terparts.  On the latter point, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that work has
moved from large firms to mid-sized and smaller firms, and Peer Monitor results for the
last four years also suggest that this may be the case.41
Another kind of segmentation that has become more evident in the past four years has
been the growing inclination of clients to handle more matters or phases of matters in-
house and to use outside counsel only for those aspects of matters that require special
skills or larger teams of lawyers than are routinely available in client law departments.42
This has been coupled in practice with a growing willingness of clients to partner with
non-traditional service providers (like legal process outsourcers) for some aspects of
work previously sent routinely to outside law firms.  This has been especially evident in
the outsourcing of discovery work in major litigations, but it has occurred in other areas
as well.
40  Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous Borders: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1477 (2010).
41  Peer Monitor data indicate that mid-sized firms outside the AmLaw 200 have actually fared better than their larger counter-
parts over the past four years in terms of demand growth and productivity.  Some of this difference in performance is un-
doubtedly attributable to the fact that high end financial and corporate work of the sort traditionally handled by AmLaw 200
firms was particularly hard hit in the recent recession.  It is also possible, however, that there has been some shift in work by
clients from larger to smaller firms.
42  According to the 2011 HBR Law Department Survey of some 219 companies worldwide, corporations were substantially
increasing their reliance on in-house legal staffs to handle continuing growth in legal demands.  As the editor of the survey
observed, "Law departments are recognizing that they can do more with less by building up their in-house capabilities. . . .
We are hearing from our consulting clients across industries that they are limiting the use of outside counsel to high profile
or specific areas of expertise rather than to support the growing volume of work.  With the rising cost of outside counsel, we
expect this trend will continue."  HBR Consulting Press Release, Law Departments Increase Internal Staff and Keep More
Work In-House, According to 2011 HBR Law Department Survey, Oct. 7, 2011.  While HBR's 2012 survey covering some
260 companies showed a rebound in outside counsel spending, it also noted that in-house capacity had continued to grow,
as 57 percent of respondents reported an increase in the total number of lawyers working in-house.  HBR Consulting Press
Release, Legal Spending Returns to 2009 Survey Levels, According to 2012 HBR Law Department Survey, Sept. 27, 2012.
Whatallofthismeansisthat,evenastheeconomyimprovesandthedemandfor
legalservicesincreases,someoftheservicestraditionallyprovidedbylawfirmswill
likelynever return–atleastnotintheirpriorform.Andthatinturnsuggeststhat,to
besuccessfulinthenewmarketenvironment,firmswillneedtobemuchmoreflexi-
bleintheirworkprocessesandmuchmoreopentopartneringwiththeirclientsin
findinginnovativewaystoaddresslegalneeds.AsJohnCollins,DeputyGeneral
CounseloftheRoyalBankofScotland,putitindescribinghisowncompany'sefforts
tochangeitsapproachtoworkingwithoutsidecounsel,"Lawfirmsunderstandwhat
we'reproposingandwe'vestartedtoseemovesinthemarketbutfirmsareyettoget
fullyonboardandembraceit....Thelegalprofessionisn'timmunefromprocessre-
engineering:itneedstoflexandkeepchangingandlawfirmsneedtoembracethat
changeiftheyaretoremaincompetitive."43
Market Overcapacity
Priortothecurrenteconomicdownturn(i.e.,intheyearspriorto2008),whendemand
forlegalserviceswasgrowingatalmost4percentperyear,productivitygrowthinthe
legalmarketwasessentiallyflat.44 That,ofcourse,suggestsovercapacityintermsof
thenumberoflawyersavailabletoperformtheworkathand.Inthefouryearssince,
withdemandgrowthnegativetoflat,theovercapacityproblemhasbecomeevenmore
serious.Theproblemhasseveraldimensions.
First,aspreviouslynoted,since2008,lawfirmshavecutbacksignificantlyontheir
hiringandhavegonethroughseveralroundsoflayoffsofbothlegalandnon-legal
staff.Firmshavealsobeguntomovetowardmoreflexiblestaffingmodels,expanding
theiruseofnon-partnertrackassociates,staffattorneys,andcontractlawyers.Going
forward,itislikelythatfirmswillremainconservativeintheirhiringpoliciesevenas
demandbeginstogrow.Asaresult,firmswillprobablyberelativelysmallerinterms
ofthenumberofpartnersandtraditionalpartner-trackassociatesandrelativelylarger
intermsofthenumberofotherlawyersandnon-lawyerprofessionals.
Thesetrendsareconfirmedinthe2012LawFirmsinTransitionSurveyconductedby
AltmanWeil.Basedonresponsesfrom238U.S.firms,thatsurveyfoundthat:
• Aquarteroftherespondingfirmsreducedordiscontinuedhiringfirst-year
associatesduring2011,and40percentshranktheirsummerassociate
programs–bothhighlysignificantnumbersconsideringthecutsmadein
prioryears;
• Only21percentofrespondentsindicatedtheyintendedtohiremorefirst-
yearassociatesin2012thantheydidin2011;
• Some55percentofrespondingfirmsexpectedsmallerfirst-yearassociate
classeswillbeapermanenttrendgoingforward(comparedtoonly40
percentexpressingthatviewthepreviousyear);
43AsquotedinHildebrandtInstituteBLOG,The New Normal: Collaboration between Corporates, Law Firms and LPO
Providers,Nov,15,2012,hildebrandtblog.com/.../the-new-normal-collaboration-between-corporates-law-firms-and-lpo-
provider...
44See note7supra.
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• Oftherespondents,58percentalsobelievedthatreducedassociate
leverageisapermanenttrend(upfrom45percentthepreviousyear);
• Nearlyaquarteroftherespondingfirmssaidtheyintendedtoincreasetheir
numberofnon-partnertrackassociatesin2012;
• Morethan80percentofthefirmsplannedtomaintainorincreasetheir
numberofcontractlawyersandparalegalsin2012(inmanycasestotakeon
workpreviouslyperformedbypartner-trackassociates);
• Some66percentofrespondentsbelievedthatincreaseduseofcontract
lawyersisapermanenttrendinthelegalmarket;and
• Lookingfiveyearsahead,respondentfirmsexpectedmorereductionsin
partner-trackassociatesthaninnon-partnertrackassociatesorparalegals.45
Buttheovercapacityproblembeingexperiencedbylawfirmsisalsopartofalarger
trend–thatofexcesscapacityinthelegalmarketasawhole.Asoneseasonedob-
serverofthemarket,BruceMacEwen,haspointedout,forthenexttenyearsitislikely
thatAmericanlawschoolswillbegraduatingovertwiceasmanynewlawyersaswillbe
neededtofillthelegaljobsavailable.46
Whileexcesscapacityinthemarketiscertainlynotgoodnewsforyounglawyersor,for
thatmatter,forlawschools,itprovidesanenvironmentinwhichlawfirmsshouldhave
theflexibilitytoredesigntheirstaffingmodelstorespondtoclientdemands.Byem-
bracingalternativeapproachestostaffing–includingincreaseduseofstaffattorneys
andnon-partnertrackassociates,contractlawyers,andpart-timeattorneys–firmscan
createmoreefficientandcosteffectivewaystodeliverlegalservices.Todoso,how-
ever,willrequireabandoningthetraditionalmodelofalawfirmconsistingonlyofpart-
nersandpartnersinwaiting(i.e.,partner-trackassociates).
Simplystated,thetraditionallawfirmstaffingmodel–enforcedthrough"uporout"
policies–assumesthattheonlylawyersworthhavingarethosecapableofrisingto
thetopandbecomingequitypartners.Whilemostlawfirmleaderswouldprobably
agreethatthisapproachnolongermakeseconomicorstructuralsense,itstillhas
strongemotionalappealtomanylawfirmpartners.Itisprobablyforthatreasonthat
firmshavebeenslowtoimplementrealchangestotheirlegalstaffingpolicies,
changesthatwouldcreategenuinecareertracksfornon-partnerlawyers,providea
comprehensiveapproachtoprofessionaldevelopmentatalllevels,andbuildrespect
withintheirfirmsfortheprofessionalcapabilitiesoflawyerswhomakeimportantcon-
tributionsbutmayneverbecomepartners.Firmsthatemergeassuccessfulinthe
newrealitiesofthelegalmarketwilllikelybethosethatfindwaysto"burntheships"
andfullyembracesuchrealchangesfortheprofessionalsintheirfirms.Theresult
couldbemoresustainablemodelsoflawfirmpracticethatbothrespondtomarket
realitiesandprovidemoremeaningfulprofessionalopportunitiesforeveryone.
45AltmanWeil2012Survey,atv.
46UsingprojectionsfromtheU.S.BureauofLaborStatistics,MacEwenpointsoutthatbetween2010and2020theU.S.
economywillproduce218,000jobopeningsforlawyersandjudicialclerks,orabitlessthan22,000openingsperyear.
(Theseprojectionsincludefillingtheslotsofretireesandotherjobforcedeparturesaswellasnewjobopenings.)Atthe
sametime,U.S.lawschoolsgraduated44,004studentsin2010,44,258in2011,and44,495in2012–enoughnewlawyers
tofill61percentofalltheavailablejobsforthenextdecade.BruceMacEwen,AdamSmith,Esq.BLOG,Growth Is Dead:
Part 2 – Excess Capacity,Sept.10,2012,http://www.adamsmithesq.com/2012/09/growth-is-dead-part-2/?single&print.
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Changing Partnership Models
Evenbeforethecurrenteconomicdownturn,therewasconsiderabledebatewithinthe
legalprofessionabouttheevolvingmanagementstructuresoflawfirmsandtheextentto
whichthechangesthatwereoccurringeitherthreatenedorenhancedconceptsofprofes-
sionalism.Needlesstosay,thepastfouryearshave,ifanything,onlyfurtherpolarizedthat
debate.Initsmoststarkform,thedebateisoftencharacterizedaswhetherthepracticeof
lawshouldbea"profession"ora"business,"agrosslyoversimplifieddichotomysincelaw
practicehasobviouslybeenbothforaverylongtime.
Itisundeniable,however,thatthegovernanceandmanagementstructuresoflawfirms
havechangedsignificantlyoverthepast20yearsandthatthemarketshiftsofthepast
fouryearsarelikelytocontinuethattrend.Itisalsotrue,aspreviouslynoted,thatthese
changes–coupledwiththeadversefinancialimpactoftheeconomicdownturn–have
resultedinincreasedstresslevelsandgrowingmoraleproblemsinmanyfirms,aslarge
numbersofpartnershavefeltthemselvesincreasinglydisenfranchised.
Someobservershaveopinedthatthelegalmarket(atleastasregardslargelawfirms)is
movinginexorablytowardacorporatemodelofessentiallytop-downmanagement,inwhich
practicinglawyerswillbecomelittlemorethanfungibleemployees.Inourjudgment,that
predictionisnotwellfounded,butitistruethatfirmsarestrugglingtostrikeanewandap-
propriatebalancebetweenmodelsthatprovidenecessarycentralizedmanagementand
structuresthatpreservetheessentialindependenceofprofessionaljudgment.
Inrecentyears,therehasbeenconsiderableacademicattentiondevotedtothisproblem,
withsomeofthemoreinterestingworkfocusingontheideaoforganizationalarchetypes–
overarchingconceptsaddressingpatternsoforganizationalstructuresandmanagement
systemsandtheideas,beliefs,andvaluesthatunderliethem.Theapproachhasbeen
usedtoanalyzetheevolutionofprofessionalorganizationsincludingaccountingfirms,
architecturalfirms,hospitals,andlawfirms.47
Usingthisapproach,onegroupofscholarshasdescribeda"P2"formoforganizationas
thearchetypeoftheclassicprofessionalpartnership.48 IntheP2organization,"[a]part-
nerisanownerofthefirm,isinvolvedinitsoverallmanagement,andisakeyproduction
worker."49 Theworkrequirestheexerciseofprofessionaljudgmentthatis"notamenable
toclosebureaucraticcontrol,"andcontroltherefore"hastobeexercisednotthrough
standardizationofroutinesbutthroughstandardizationofskills."50 ProfessionalsinP2
organizationsresisttheuseofdetailedcostaccountingandfinancialtargetstomanage
behavior.51 Andsuch"professionalorganizationshaveastrongserviceethicanda
strongconceptofcommunityinvolvementandresponsibility.Partnershipimpliesaca-
reercommitment,whichisinconsistentwithfinancialmyopiaandtightaccountability."52
47Fortheapplicationoforganizationalarchetypeanalysistolawfirms,seeDavidJ.Cooper,BobHinings,RoystonGreen-
wood, & John L. Brown, Sedimentation and Transformation in Organizational Change: The Case of Canadian Law Firms,
17ORG.STUDIES623(1996);AshlyPinnington&TimothyMorris,Archetypye Change in Professional Organizations: 
Survey Evidence from Large Law Firms,14BRITISHJ.MGT.85(2003).
48  Royston Greenwood, Bob Hinings, & John L. Brown, "P2-Form" Strategic Management: Corporate Practices in Profes-
sional Partnerships,44ACAD.MGT.J.725(1990).
49DavidBrock,The Changing Professional Organization: A Review of Competing Archetypes,INTL.J.MGT.REV.160
(2006).
50Id. at732.
51Id. at735.
52Id.
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The structural features of the P2 form reflect a distinctive understanding of what it means
to be a professional.  It includes concepts like participation by the full partnership in gover-
nance decisions, the provision of services by professionals exercising relatively unfettered
discretion, and the use of collegial structures as the basis of organization – all designed
"to respect professionals' desire for autonomy, to maintain the principle of partnership,
and to promote acceptance and cooperation." 53
During the period of relative stability in the legal market, the organizational features of
the P2 model and the understandings that supported them were aligned and reinforced
one another.  As the external market began to change, however, competitive forces
drove modifications in the structural features of law firms that resulted over time in a mis-
alignment with the underlying ideas, beliefs, and values of many law firm partners.  As a
result, some scholars argue that law firms are now moving toward a new organizational
archetype, that of the managed professional business ("MPB"). 54
Unlike the P2 archetype that stresses the role of lawyers as professionals applying
their specialized expertise on behalf of clients who are "relatively ignorant about
their needs," 55 the MPB model "shifts the view of the client to someone, often cor-
porate counsel, who wants demonstrable value for money, and takes legal expertise
for granted." 56 The MPB model also shifts the meanings of both "professional" and
"partner."
The attributes which sociologists of the profession used to identify as the hallmarks of a 
professional, such as education, vocation, esoteric knowledge, self-regulation, and civil-
ity, have been replaced, or at least augmented, by an interpretation that stresses punctu-
ality, style, dynamism, financial success, and entrepreneurialism.  The meaning of the
term "partner" has also changed [away from an emphasis on autonomy].  In the MPB, a
partner is a team player, one who trusts the leadership and works for the common good,
for example by transferring work to the person in the firm who is most competent or short
of work. 57
In our view, this analysis of the contrasting structures and underlying values of the P2
and MPB archetypes sets out a useful way of thinking about the tensions at work in
many law firms today.  Plainly, to be successful in today's world, most every firm of any
significant size must respond to the changing competitive realities of the market by cen-
tralizing many of the decisions previously made in more collegial ways and by embracing
a consistent strategic vision that is uniform across the firm and that drives decisions and
actions in all of its practice areas.  At the same time, a firm must preserve the essential
qualities that nourish and support great lawyering, including structures that preserve the
independence of professional judgment and the autonomy of lawyers to act in the best
interest of their clients.  This requires striking a delicate balance between the P2 and
MPB models, and different firms will find it necessary to strike that balance in different
ways.  The important point is that finding the right balance requires deliberate effort and
an appreciation for the competing values underlying each model, and getting the bal-
ance right forms an essential part of the glue that holds great law firms together, even in
turbulent economic times.   
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53  Id. at 750.
54  See David J. Cooper, Bob Hinings, Royston Greenwood, & John L. Brown, Sedimentation and Transformation in Organi-
zational Change: The Case of Canadian Law Firms, 17 ORG. STUDIES 623, 626 (1996).
55  Id. at 630.
56  Id, at 630-31.
57  Id. at 631.
Conclusion
Theyear2012wasoneofcontinuingchallengesforlawfirmsandtheirleadersthrough-
outtheworld.Thepersistenteconomicdownturnthatbeganinmid-2008continuedinto
itsfifthyearand,whiledemandgrowthforlegalserviceshasbeguntoincreasemodestly,
itislikelythatthemarketfacesmanymoremonthsofrelativelyslowgrowth.For2013,
weprojectthatmostfirmswillcontinuetostruggletomaintainprofitabilityasthecom-
binedeffectsofslowdemandgrowth,decliningrealizationrates,andpersistentoverca-
pacitywillcontinuetoeatintoprofitmargins.Wedoexpecttoseesomegrowthin
revenuesandcontinuedrigorouseffortstomanageexpenses,butoverallweanticipate
thattherewillbeonlymodestgrowthinprofitsperequitypartnerinthecurrentyear–
probablyinthelowsingledigitrange.
Moreover,itisnowincreasinglyclearthat,evenwhenmorenormalgrowthreturns,the
marketwillbeverydifferentfromthewayitlookedinthepre-2008period.Buildingon
underlyingforcesthatwerepresenteveninthepre-recessionperiod,theeconomic
downturnservedasacatalystthathaschangedthelegalmarketinfundamentalways,
nottheleastofwhichhasbeentheshiftfromaseller'stoabuyer'smarketforlegalserv-
ices.Withthatshifthascomegrowingclientinsistenceonefficiency,predictability,and
costeffectivenessinthedeliveryoflegalservices,arealitythathasrequiredafundamen-
talparadigmshiftinlawfirmsthemselves.Thenew,moreintenselycompetitivemarket
hasalsorequiredlawfirmstorefocustheirownstrategiesandtotakestepstomanage
theirbusinessesmoreeffectively.Fromaggressiveexpensecontrolstoimprovedwork
processesandfromalternativepricingstructurestomoreexpansivestaffingstrategies,
firmshavescrambledtoaddressthechallengesoftherapidlychangingmarket.
Thegoodnewsisthatmanyfirmshavebeguntoseepositiveresultsfromtheseefforts,
andalmostalllawfirmleadersnowacknowledgethatfundamentalchangesareoccurring
inthemarketthatrequiredifferentresponsesthaninthepast.Thechallengenowisfor
firmsandtheirpartnerstobewillingtothinkoutsidethetraditionalmodels–to"burnthe
ships"ifyouwill–andtobewillingtotrynewandcreativewaystodeliverthehighquality
andresponsivelegalservicesthattheirclientswant,usingeffectivebusinessmodelsthat
servebothfinancialobjectivesandprofessionalvalues.
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TheCenterfortheStudyoftheLegalProfessionatGeorgetownLawisdevotedto
promotinginterdisciplinaryresearchontheprofessioninformedbyanawarenessof
thedynamicsofmodernpractice;providingstudentswithasophisticatedunder-
standingoftheopportunitiesandchallengesofamodernlegalcareer;andfurnishing
membersofthebar,particularlythoseinorganizationaldecision-makingpositions,
broadperspectivesontrendsanddevelopmentsinpractice.
GeorgetownLaw’sexecutiveeducationprogramisanintegralpartoftheCenter’sactiv-
itiesandusesarigorous,research-basedapproachtothedevelopmentofopenenroll-
mentandcustomprogramsonleadership,strategy,leadingteams,andcollaboration
forattorneysinlawfirmsandlegaldepartments.FormoreinformationontheCenter
andtheexecutiveeducationprogram,visitourwebsitesorcontactLisaRohrerat
lr590@law.georgetown.edu.
CenterfortheStudyoftheLegalProfessionandExecutiveEducation
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/legal-profession/index.cfm
ExecutiveEducation
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/continuing-legal-education/executive-
education/index.cfm
PeerMonitor®isadynamic,livebenchmarkingprogramthatprovidesany-time
accesstocriticalfirmassessmentinformationandallowsyoutocompareyourfirm
againstselectedpeers,withdetailsforpracticeperformance.
PeerMonitor®providesthemostcurrentinformationavailable,pullingdirectlyfrom
participatingfirms’recentmonthlyfinancialstatements,yetensuresyourfirm’sdetails
remainstrictlyconfidential.Participantsreceiveanaggregatebenchmarkofpeerfirms’
datatocompareagainsttheirowndata,sotheybenefitfrominsightsinindustrytrends
whilestillprotectingtheirindividualprivacy.
Formoreinformation,pleasevisitusat peermonitor.thomsonreuters.com orcontact
MarkMediceatmark.medice@thomsonreuters.com.
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